[Column] What if the North conducts its 7th nuclear test?

Chang Se-jeong

The author is an editorial writer for the JoongAng Ilbo.

While South Korea is marred with an internal split over the aftermath of the recent Korea-Japan summit, North Korea and China are making suspicious moves. Wang Yajun, named China’s ambassador to North Korea in February 2021, arrived in Pyongyang on March 27 after two years of his appointment. As the North-China border was blocked due to the Covid-19 pandemic, he was not able to travel to the North, but the ban is now largely lifted. It remains to be seen if the two will resume their suspended people-to-people exchanges and if China will give food assistance to the North to help address its famine and food shortage.

Speculations also grew that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may visit China. Kim visited China in March, May, June 2018 and January 2019. As Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the North in June 2019, Kim’s visit to China in return is seen as an obvious move.

After Xi has completed awarding himself the third consecutive term and visited Russia, speculations are high that the next step will be the China-North summit. Some experts say Kim could visit China in April; others say it will happen around the time of the Group of 7 Summit from May 11 to 13 in Hiroshima, Japan and a Korea-Japan-U.S. summit on the sidelines of the event.

Amid such speculations, a U.S. think tank raised the possibility of a seventh nuclear test in North Korea on signs of high nuclear material production activity at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. If the North conducts the test, the United States will exert strong pressure on the North, such as deploying strategic assets. It remains to be seen what the U.S. will do to calm an ally’s doubt on its nuclear umbrella — or extended deterrence — as the two counties will celebrate the 70th anniversary of their alliance this year.

Another noteworthy point is the reaction of China and Russia if the North sends a shock wave to Northeast Asia and the international community with its nuke test. When North Korea staged a provocation by firing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November 2017, China and Russia backed the U.S.-led sanctions resolution 2397 at the UN Security Council. Pressured by its allies’ alarming move, North Korea had turned to appeasement and participated in the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics.

After the historic North-U.S. summit in Singapore in June 2018 and another in Vietnam in February 2019, the supremacy competition between the U.S. and China became fiercer. After Russia started a war on Ukraine in February last year, the new Cold War structure was consolidated, and the attitudes of Beijing and Moscow changed. After the North staged another ICBM launch in May last year, China and Russia used their veto powers at the UN Security Council, differently from the case in 2017. It shocked the international community.

In November last year, the Security Council could not even issue a chairman’s statement to condemn the North’s ICBM provocation due to the opposition of China and Russia. Their irresponsible attitude of abandoning the role as permanent members of the Security Council has created a split in the body, and the North is now using the rift to advance its nuclear capabilities.

Will China and Russia continue to ignore the North’s seventh nuclear test? A senior diplomatic source said China has recently spread word in the diplomatic community that ICBM and nuclear tests are different. It can be interpreted that Beijing will react if Pyongyang conducts a nuclear test. But it is unclear what China’s intention is.

Diplomats speculate that there are three possible scenarios depending on the intention of Xi, whose position was backed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. First, China and Russia will join the international sanctions like in the past or at least issue a statement to condemn North Korea.
Second, China and Russia, conscious of the NPT regime, will maintain their cooperation with North Korea, but abstain from voting, allowing the UN to pass a sanctions resolution.

Third is the worst-case scenario. Just like the case with the North’s ICBM firings, China and Russia will keep mum and nearly condone the North’s nuclear provocation.

Then, what will the South’s foreign affairs and security officials have to prepare? Ahead of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s state visit to the U.S. on April 26 and an upcoming summit, the disturbed atmosphere prompted by the replacement of his national security advisor must be quickly corrected. Above all, the officials must closely coordinate with their U.S. counterparts on a plan to strengthen extended deterrence and reconfirm what Washington’s “red line” is on the North Korea issues.

Another difficult issue is how Seoul will approach Beijing on the North Korea nuclear issue. The Moon Jae-in administration stuck with a low profile, earnestly hoping that China would play a role, but the outcome was empty. It may be wise to give up a hasty hope since China is unlikely to pressure North Korea harshly. It is more realistic to strengthen diplomatic, security and military cooperation with the U.S. and Japan while asking China to play a responsible role as a permanent member of the Security Council. As the international order has changed, we must admit to the cold reality that our options have narrowed significantly.