Flexibility matters when it comes to diplomacy
Wi Sung-lac
The author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.
Amid a tense standoff between South and North Korea, South Korea’s relations with China continue to worsen. After inter-Korean dialogue came to a halt, communication channels between South Korea and China also are being shut. That’s in sharp contrast with South Korea’s even closer ties with the United States and Japan. Then, signs of dialogue between Japan and North Korea, the U.S. and China, and Japan and China have shown. Some people accuse the Yoon Suk Yeol administration — and the U.S. and Japanese governments — of only helping deepen South Korea’s isolation by joining with the U.S. and Japan to pressure North Korea and check China even when Japan wants to talk with North Korea — and after the U.S. and Japan started dialogue with China.
But such accusations look like an emotional reaction. First of all, given the U.S. and Japan’s original stance to have dialogue with North Korea, their rapprochement with Pyongyang is nothing new. In particular, high-level talks between the U.S. and China and Japan and China are not abnormal, given their need for dialogue to manage conflict around them. North Korea tends to have dialogue with foreign countries — only temporarily when the need arises. But the country is bent on sophisticating its nuclear and missile capability after stopping dialogue with others. Internally, North Korea suffers from its colossal lockdown from the Covid-19 pandemic, coupled with its chronic economic hardship. So, the country must strike a delicate balance between the strategic need to show off its missile capabilities and the need for external exchanges — and economic aid from neighbors — to improve the people’s livelihood. But the North would persist with nuclear and missile provocations at least until the U.S. presidential election in 2024. Pyongyang could even be tempted to have dialogue with Tokyo before the U.S. election though Japan is not its main partner for dialogue.
The problem is not the willingness of the U.S. and Japan to have dialogue with North Korea and China, but the intention of North Korea and China to isolate South Korea from their dialogue with the U.S. and Japan. North Korea will most likely reject any dialogue with South Korea even after turning to dialogue with the U.S. and Japan. The North’s strategy of insulating the South from whatever it does is deep-rooted, but the degree will be severe this time considering the conservative Yoon administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea. China also would pressure South Korea by being reluctant to have high-level talks with the Yoon government after branding it as the most anti-Chinese government in the South in history. What matters for us is how to deal with such hawkish stances of North Korea and China.
More dark clouds are expected to gather on the future of South Korea. North Korea will continue launching ICBMs and satellites to the point of proclaiming the completion of its audacious nuclear program through another — and probably final — nuclear test. That will certainly worsen the inter-Korean relations further. China’s apparent embracing of North Korea even under such circumstances will make Seoul-Beijing relations be frozen further. President Yoon plans to participate in the NATO summit this month and later a South Korea-U.S.-Japan summit in Washington to reinforce security cooperation with the ally and Japan. At every possible moment, China and North Korea will protest the move vehemently.
The situation will be headed to an inflection point around the time of the U.S. presidential election in November. After judging that it already proved the level of its nuclear and missile technology, North Korea may turn to dialogue with a new U.S. administration. The policy shift could be more drastic if Donald Trump returns or at least a new U.S. president with views on North Korea similar to Trump’s appears. Even if Joe Biden is reelected president, North Korea will likely attempt to turn the situation around. How will the Yoon administration respond to that? The conservative government needs to prepare for such a possibility in advance.
In the past, South Korea often opposed a sudden turnaround in the mood toward dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea. If that opposition does not work, the South demanded that the U.S. get an agreement from the North to have dialogue with South Korea when the U.S. and North Korea meet.
What’s important for South Korea is to play a role in promoting denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula while strengthening nuclear deterrence and pressuring North Korea. What matters is South Korea’s role as a contributor to peace, not an obstructor.
To do that, the country must have a diplomatic position compatible with a positive actor rather than getting stuck in negative feeling. Maintaining overly confrontational posture toward North Korea and China is not productive as it narrows South Korea’ diplomatic space. Instead of falling into the temptation for obstructor, the government must leave room for diplomacy with North Korea and China to brace for the turnaround and accumulate diplomatic assets for later. The Yoon administration must keep in mind the possibility of North Korea turning to dialogue. The government must keep dialogue channels with China open, too. I hope the government proves its wisdom and ability to cope with such changes in the future.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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