The Gaza war and the Korean Peninsula
Michael Green
The author is CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The war in Gaza may seem to be yet another eruption of Middle East violence — a human tragedy on the other side of the world that captures headlines but ultimately has little impact on the security of the Korean peninsula. However, one does not have to search far to see that Hamas’ brutal surprise attack on Israel points to menacing geopolitical trends that could very much affect the security of the Korean peninsula if unchecked.
The first thing is to recognize is that this was not a spontaneous uprising by disaffected Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The Netanyahu government had been receiving deserved criticism for incorporating intolerant extremists in its cabinet, embroiling Israeli society and the Israel Defense Force in divisive a constitutional debate, and overly politicizing the critical U.S.-Israel relationship. None of this mattered to Hamas, though, since that organization is dedicated to the destruction of Israel regardless of the country’s policies or leadership. Nor do the shortcomings of the Israeli government even remotely justify the genocidal targeting of civilian men, women and children for torture, rape, murder, and mutilation. Israel has a right under international law to defend itself and a moral duty to its people to destroy Hamas’ capacity to repeat such atrocities.
There is strong evidence that this war was instigated with support from Iran and that matters to the security of the international system more broadly. Tehran was watching Israel move towards improved relations and diplomatic normalization with Saudi Arabia and moderate Gulf States in a realignment of the Middle East that would have isolated Iranian influence and undercut the regime’s own commitment to the destruction of Israel and “death to America.” It is likely that the criminality of Hamas’ attacks was very much intended to provoke an Israeli military response that would upset the Arab world and derail diplomacy between Israel and many of her neighbors.
This geopolitical dimension should concern Koreans. Korean strategy depends on a stable and rules-based international order, but that order is being eroded in different ways by Russia’s war on Ukraine in Eastern Europe, China’s grey zone coercion in Asia, and Iran’s proxy violence through Hezbollah and Hamas in the broader Middle East. Iran and North Korea are in different categories from China since North Korea and Iran will resort to more extreme provocations and risk war to challenge the status quo. North Korea and Iran each stand to benefit when the other engages in provocations of this kind (which is not true of China). That explains why Tehran and Pyongyang are incentivized to reinforce each other’s asymmetrical capabilities if they can do it without putting themselves at risk of attack. Thus, North Korea in 2007 was caught providing Yongbyong-type reactor capabilities to Syria and has been caught today providing S-7 rocket propelled grenades to Hamas which were used against Israel (Pyongyang denies this but the video images are damning).
The Israelis are particularly sensitive to the Iran-North Korea-Hamas-Hezbollah connection, which extends to illegal and illicit activities and even proliferation in addition to conventional arms transfers. It was the Israeli Air Force that destroyed the North-Korea designed El Kibar reactor in Syria in 2007. When I was working on North Korea policy in the White House the embassy most focused on the North Korean nuclear activities (other than Korea, Japan and China) was Israel. And for good reason. The U.S. negotiations with Tehran to halt Iran’s HEU pathway to nuclear weapons could be completely leapfrogged if Pyongyang chose to transfer its technologies to Tehran. This would be a high risk move for North Korea, of course, but only if we are vigilant, have a strong deterrent posture, and hold firm on the redline of horizontal proliferation.
The geopolitics of the Gaza War also matter to Korea because of the potential impact on the world economy. Korea is the world’s fourth largest importer of crude oil. Over the past six months, Korean firms shifted imports away from Russia and towards Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Gulf — just in time for this war. Israel is not looking to expand the war beyond the destruction of the Hamas threat in Gaza, but we do not know the extent of Tehran’s ambitions and can see that Iranian proxy Hezbollah is threatening to escalate conflict on Israel’s northern flank. Is that a bluff to help Hamas or part of a larger military campaign? The crisis is already unsettling energy markets and a broader war that shut down the Gulf of Hormuz would be devastating in economic and of course human terms.
One thing I do not worry about as much is that China will somehow gain geopolitical advantage from this crisis. Beijing’s paralysis and impotency are on full display. Despite a growing economic and presumably political influence in the Middle East, China is stuck. On the one hand, Beijing is bragging about inviting Iran into the BRICs to counterbalance U.S.-led international institutions such as the G-7. On the other hand, Beijing is just as terrified of Islamic extremism as the United States and Europe. This conflict does not fit neatly into Xi Jinping’s worldview and it shows.
That said, the Iran-North Korea nexus is more than enough to keep us worried.
What can Seoul do? As a major importer of oil from the Middle East, Korea will want to maintain good diplomatic relations with the Arab world — but given the motivations and connections of Iran and Hamas to North Korea, Seoul should also want Israel to succeed in destroying Hamas’ ability to do this again. This is not the time for Korean diplomacy to go it alone — it will be critical to maintain solidarity with the other democratic advanced economies, beginning with the United States but including Europe, Australia, and Japan. That coalition of countries will stand by Israel, but also quietly urge Israel to use judicious restraint where necessary to maintain as much international support as possible and to ensure the deterrent signals to Iran are clear. The Yoon government needs to be at that table — even if it is behind closed doors — to shape an international strategy that defeats Hamas, deters Iran, and restores the longer-term possibilities for peace in the Middle East and the Korean peninsula.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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