Can nuclear armament really cut the knot?

KIM HYOUNG-GU
The author is the Washington bureau chief of the JoongAng Ilbo.

Perhaps the redeployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula is not a matter of a distant future.

This idea hovered in my mind as I recently interviewed top foreign affairs and security strategists in the United States, including former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Richard Lawless, former National Security Adviser John Bolton and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge A. Colby.

They started by acknowledging the reality that North Korea is a de facto nuclear power and has the capability to attack the U.S. mainland. They understand the concerns and questions in Korea about relying solely on the extended deterrence, or nuclear umbrella, provided by the United States. Former National Security Advisor Bolton said that the U.S. needs to assure that extended deterrence capabilities are not hypothetical, while former Deputy Undersecretary Lawless suggested a “NATO-style nuclear sharing.”

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary Colby, who is considered to become the National Security Advisor if former President Donald Trump is re-elected, gave a more dramatic warning. He said that in a situation where the United States loses military advantage against China, more nuclear weapons should be made to offset the lagging nuclear balance. He addressed the limits of the Washington Declaration on the establishment of the Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in April 2023. I was rather convinced by his honest comment that Uncle Sam cannot promise to defend Korea’s security at the cost of sacrificing an American city to North Korea’s nuclear attack.

In fact, he said in an interview with Voice of America in 2019 that he opposed South Korea’s own nuclear armament. However, due to a series of the North’s provocations, he insists that Korea should consider its nuclear armament by lowering expectations for America’s conventional military support and defend the Korean Peninsula firsthand.

The official stance of the U.S. government is still focused on the denuclearization of the peninsula. In a telephone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden reaffirmed the consistent commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. There are still concerns that if South Korea is nuclear-armed, it will be the beginning of nuclear proliferation in East Asia. But it is certainly unusual that the South’s nuclear armament, which had been a taboo, is openly discussed within the premise of “checking on China.”

It is true that the path to denuclearization is difficult. But at times like this, the Korea-U.S. military alliance should be advanced, and self-defense capabilities should be drastically strengthened to address questions about the extended deterrence.

At the same time, South Korea must continue to engage in behind-the-scenes dialogue with North Korea to prevent an accidental military clash. The North Korean nuclear issue has become a conundrum that should be solved with our hands tied.