Why Moon’s denuclearization bid failed

Kim Byung-yeon
The author is a chair professor of economics at Seoul National University.

Only an accurate evaluation of the past can find the right path to the future. In this respect, former President Moon Jae-in’s recent memoir detailing his approach to the conundrum of denuclearizing North Korea is significant. But the book only affirmed key reasons for the botched denuclearization: his lack of knowledge about complex equations and his inability to comprehend the protean nature of geopolitics.

Former President Moon Jae-in, right, former U.S. President Donald Trump, middle, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un talk after their summit in the Freedom House at Panmunjom, June 30, 2019. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

First of all, Moon couldn’t understand the intriguing structure of denuclearization due to his blind trust in North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Clearly, he had hope, but didn’t have any appropriate strategy. As Moon was engrossed in having dialogue with Kim and mediating a U.S.-North summit, he didn’t think about creating the conditions for an agreement on denuclearization. The book suggests that what prompted the North to come to the negotiation table was the economic sanctions that took effect in 2016 and 2017. The negotiation could have borne fruit if the sanctions were tightened. If the tough sanctions enforced in late 2017 were maintained, a partial denuclearization in return for partially lifting sanctions could have started. Instead, Moon hastily invited Kim to the negotiating table at Panmunjom in April 2018, which only emboldened the North Korean leader to demand a higher price for denuclearization. In the book, Moon even confessed that if he had foreseen the failed U.S.-North summit in Hanoi the following year, he would have lifted sanctions on the North preemptively.

This confession is unfathomable. Moon’s administration officials already advised against anticipating tangible results from the Hanoi summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump. One month before the summit, I wrote a column pessimistic about its success. The United States was also suspicious of the real motive behind a top North Korean official’s visit to the White House in January 2019, just one month before the Hanoi summit. Despite Washington’s hope for the emissary’s presentation in advance of its denuclearization plans, he kept mum. U.S. officials reportedly urged Trump to not accept Kim Jong-un’s proposal without consulting with security experts. If even scholars like me sensed the gloomy atmosphere in Washington, how could the Korean president not know it? Whom was he listening to at that time?

President Moon attributed the no-deal outcome from Hanoi to Washington’s change of mind. According to the memoir, North Korea proposed that the United States first lift economic sanctions related to its people’s livelihoods in return for dismantling nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, but Washington rejected the proposal after “abruptly abandoning a phased approach.” Moon didn’t know it was a hoax from the beginning. The livelihood sanctions the North mentioned refers to five economic sanctions the United States imposed on the North since 2016. Here, the term “livelihood” itself is a trick. North Korea insisted that lifting these sanctions represented a “phased approach” as the North demanded lifting it first among the different types of U.S. sanctions. Washington immediately knew it was a scam; North Korea just wanted to lift the most effective economic sanctions by feigning a humanitarian request to the impulsive U.S. president. Still, Moon wrote that he couldn’t understand why the United States dismissed the demand as “being excessive,” and also blamed neocons like National Security Advisor John Bolton.

Moon’s lack of understanding on geopolitics is also noteworthy. He wrote that the United States’ insistence on Singapore as the venue for the first U.S.-North summit helped North Korea and China get closer. As Kim Jong-un had to use a Chinese airplane to go to Singapore, he had to have a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Moon said. In reality, Kim and Xi met twice before the U.S.-North summit in Singapore, specifically one month before the Panmunjom summit and 10 days after the event. The North-China relations started to recover after these two meetings.

The Moon administration played a part in this recovery. The government should have tried to prevent the inter-Korean summit from helping consolidate North-China relations, but it didn’t. Fearing the possibility of the North getting close to the United States due to the South’s mediation, China hastily invited Kim to Beijing to reaffirm China’s support for North Korea and advise how to negotiate during his summit with Trump. This encouraged Kim to demand a bigger price for denuclearization, making it more difficult than before.

A good leader should be knowledgeable and know how to think and make balanced judgments. The memoir didn’t show images of Moon being the head of a state. Instead, he behaved based on instinct and only saw what he wanted to see. That’s why the title of the book “From the Periphery to the Center” was not convincing. The line I agreed most with appears on the first page: “Our people have the potential to go farther at any time,” it says.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.