You can’t have it both ways

Jun Bong-geun
The author is the president of the Korea Nuclear Policy Society and a member of the Unification Division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea Campaign.

We are seeing increasing arguments that South Korea should have nuclear arms. The Korean people’s desire for nuclear weapons is nothing new. But the latest developments — such as the North’s virtual tactical nuclear counterattack drill targeting the South; Pyongyang’s threats of invasion following the declaration that the two Koreas are hostile states; some U.S. leaders’ comments condoning a nuclear-armed South Korea; the possibility of Donald Trump’s reelection and subsequent weakening of the Korea-U.S. alliance; and calls for nuclear development by influential Korean politicians — have all contributed to the idea of a nuclear-armed South Korea. But is nuclear armament the best way to ensure the South’s security?

I believe that the argument for the South’s nuclear armament overestimated uncertain benefits while underestimating tangible costs and disadvantages. In particular, the argument has overlooked the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy and the international non-proliferation regime.

First, those who support a nuclear-armed South Korea claim that nuclear armament is inevitable because nuclear weapons can only be countered by nuclear weapons. They also say that the U.S. nuclear umbrella cannot be deployed when needed because it is torn. But this argument overlooked the reality that South Korea cannot have both its own nuclear weapons and the U.S.-Korea alliance and nuclear umbrella.

Since the 1970s, the United States has consistently maintained the non-proliferation principle, demanding non-nuclear allies give up their nuclear options in return for its nuclear umbrella. Furthermore, the distrust in the U.S.-Korea alliance and the nuclear umbrella is unfounded. In fact, the alliance and nuclear umbrella have an excellent track record of ensuring peace and prosperity in the South over the past seven decades.

In contrast, security benefits of South Korea’s nuclear armaments are uncertain. In the cases of India and Pakistan, wars have been frequent and the risk of using nuclear weapons has been high, despite their mutual nuclear deterrence. In the more competitive inter-Korean relations, it is hard to expect stable mutual deterrence despite the South’s nuclear development.

Second, proponents of nuclear armaments contend that a nuclear-armed South Korea will become a superpower and that its global status will be heightened. It is a tempting argument for the country, which has always been treated as a weak state sandwiched between superpowers. But under the non-proliferation regime, nuclear weapons are not a symbol of a strong country, but an emblem of inhumanity and the destruction of peace. If South Korea purses nuclear development, the country will be stigmatized as a violator of international norms — and possibly be seen as a “rogue state.”

Third, proponents of nuclear armaments say that there is a legal way to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and develop nukes in a short period with domestic technology. “If we decide, we have the technological bases to become a nuclear-armed country in the near future, even within one year,” said President Yoon Suk Yeol.

But experts believe that it will take at least several years for South Korea to build enrichment and reprocessing facilities and extract enough fissile materials for more than 10 nukes. Furthermore, the clause governing a member’s withdrawal in Article 10 of the NPT has been ineffective since the treaty was permanently extended in 1995. In other words, if South Korea resorts to the clause, it will make Korea a rule breaker. Under an article of the NPT, a member must inform the United Nations Security Council of its decision to withdraw from the treaty, but there is no possibility that the security council will accept the South’s withdrawal from the NPT without any actions.

Fourth, the proponents of nuclear armaments have high expectations about recent statements by U.S. leaders condoning the South’s nuclearization and the possibility of Washington allowing a nuclear-armed South Korea if Trump is reelected. But all those statements were made by former U.S. officials, and none was made by responsible incumbent members of the U.S. government.

Moreover, as some of the arguments for nuclear armaments are premised on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, we should be careful. Considering the nuclear non-proliferation principle firmly rooted in U.S. political circles, it is unlikely that Washington will allow a nuclear-armed ally, even if Trump is re-elected.

If South Korea cannot own nuclear weapons for such reasons, what will be its security option? For now, the best option is utilizing the current mechanisms of U.S. Forces Korea, the nuclear umbrella and the nuclear consultative group in addition to strong conventional forces of the South’s own.

At the same time, South Korea must prepare a Plan B to brace for the worst possible scenario, in which the alliance will not work. Many talk about the option of having a nuclear potential through enrichment and reprocessing. But Uncle Sam and the international community will unlikely accept any enrichment and reprocessing for potential nuclear weapons development. Therefore, the government, the National Assembly, the atomic power industry and security experts must cooperate to create a strategy with an aim to acquire the enrichment and reprocessing rights for non-military purposes and implement the strategy according to their roles.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.