Two cheers for the three nos
The author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.
The Yoon Suk-yeol administration seeks to reverse the past alleged agreement on the so-called three nos over the deployment of the Thaad missile defense system in South Korea. The three nos refers to no additional Thaad deployments, no joining of a broader U.S. missile defense system and no Korea-U.S.-Japan military alliance. The Yoon administration prepares to scrap the deal, as it was not a “promise or agreement” by the past Korean government. But questions remain whether such simple logic will really work with China.
The agreements on three nos were reached after a long closed-door meeting between the National Security Office of the liberal Moon Jae-in administration and China. After a mutual understanding based on reciprocity, South Korea came up with the three nos policy. To the rest of the world, the foreign minister proclaimed that the government would keep to the principle. Given that background, the new conservative Yoon administration can hardly rescind it based on the simple logic that South Korea does not have to comply with it as it was not a promise nor agreement by the Moon administration.
Worse, discontent about Seoul-Beijing relations has been simmering in China. Beijing is particularly embarrassed to see a new South Korean government proactively joining the U.S.-led sanctions on China. Due to its perception of the Yoon administration as the most anti-China government in Korea’s history, China thinks it may lose the leverage it has built on the neighbor over the past 30 years. Beijing’s recent announcement of its five demands over Thaad reflects China’s deepening concern. Ditching the three nos under such circumstances poses challenges to the Yoon government.
Given Beijing’s high-handed approach to Seoul over the past three decades since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, China certainly will not gladly accept South Korea’s abandoning of the three nos. A rush to scrap the agreement with the simple logic will certainly trigger a bigger discord in their relations. The Yoon administration must find effective ways to persuade China over Thaad.
Looking back on the lead-up to the Thaad agreement, the dispute mostly resulted from South Korea’s wrong choice of action from the start. After military analysts suggested the deployment of Thaad to cope with nuclear missile threats from North Korea, past South Korean governments opted not to deploy Thaad batteries as it could be seen as South Korea’s participation in the U.S-led missile defense system, which China still opposes. South Korea made a weird decision not to irk China rather than making decision for the sake of national security.
After South Korea adhered to the unfathomable logic, the United States proposed to the Park Geun-hye administration the deployment of at least one battery of Thaad missiles to protect the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). In reaction, the Park administration took another weird three nos position — no official request from the U.S., no reviews in South Korea, and no decisions made yet. In the face of increasing U.S. demands following nuclear provocations from North Korea, the Park administration allowed the deployment of Thaad batteries to safeguard the USFK.
But China thought South Korea changed its position because of U.S. pressure, not because of the need to protect its own security. After defining the flip as a betrayal of trust, China launched severe economic retaliation on South Korea. If South Korea had made clear the purpose of the Thaad deployment — defending against North Korean missile attacks — from the beginning, it could have prevented a crisis from reaching this level, though Beijing would still oppose it.
The time has come for the Yoon administration to take a professional approach from the beginning to deal with repercussions from the Thaad deployment. The following is my recommendations.
First, the government should create a systematic frame to persuade China on the need for the Thaad deployment and publicize it at home and abroad. It must deliver its position to China clearly. When dealing with a tricky counterpart like China, the government must approach the issue methodically, including a manifestation of fundamental security damage from North Korea’s advanced tactical weapons if South Korea does not have the Thaad missile defense system. Also, Seoul must ask Beijing why China reacts so sensitively to the Thaad deployment, whose radar can only screen some parts of China while China operates radar and missile systems covering the entire Korean Peninsula.
Second, the Yoon administration must get the details of the past administrations’ negotiations over Thaad with China to find efficient ways to deal with Beijing. For instance, if China really did not keep a promise to stop retaliations on South Korea, the Yoon administration can use it as feasible grounds for the scrapping of three nos.
Third, the administration needs to consider the idea of South Korean forces taking over the Thaad batteries. That can highlight South Korea’s determination to protect security on its own.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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