[Column] What China’s leadership reshuffle means

Ahn Chi-young
The author is a professor at Incheon National University and head of the school’s Academy of Chinese Studies.

China has completed the leadership reshuffle under President Xi Jinping’s third term at the National People’s Congress, which closed on Monday. As the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, Xi has cemented his grasp over the government as he had done over the single party during the 20th convention of the Communist Party of China (CPC) last October, which paved the way for his historic third term. In another norm-breaking move, the seats at the State Council reserved for the Cabinet members went largely to Xi loyalists from regional posts.

A divorce from precedents had been expected after the amendment to the Chinese Constitution in 2018. The removal of a two-term limit on presidency — a legacy of Deng Xiaoping’s reform in 1978 to prevent a single-man dictatorship — and Xi Jinping serving as head of state commanding the military and party through a unanimous vote suggest China could return to the past. The return to a strongman dictatorship can be a worrying development.

China has been Korea’s top trade partner since 2011. Its internal changes must be closely watched due to the impact on Korea. Just because the changes feel uncomfortable, they may not necessarily be bad for Korea. What is more important is to ready an adequate response strategy by analyzing the changes and reasons behind them.

A key change under Xi’s reinforced helm is the ending of the separation of the CPC and the government to concentrate the power in Xi under the single leadership structure. The separation of the party and government was the keystone of Deng Xiaoping’s reform. Although slightly diminished since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the principle had never been challenged until Xi. Xi made it clear that the CPC and the government cannot be separated.

The denial of the separation of the two does not end in rhetoric but implies a fundamental change in the party-government relationship under Xi.

The changes are underscored in the reform outlines after the 19th and 20th CPC conventions. The State Bureau of Civil Servants under the State Council, which manages government employees, went under the CPC. The State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television was merged under the party propaganda unit. Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi did not get any posts at the State Council but remain involved in foreign affairs as members with the CPC.

The concentration of power not just reflects Xi’s personal ambitions, but also the limitations of the reforms and regime challenges from the escalating conflict with the U.S. Reforms have achieved big things for China, but nevertheless bred widespread corruption. Social and economic elites beyond party control were born and fed a new collusive relationship.

The collective leadership and separation of power could not solve the problems caused by the over-concentration of power, and even worsened the collusion to some extent. The intensifying conflict with the U.S. also demanded a faster and efficient decision-making process.

The concentration or separation of power is an issue of choice. But a leader of unanimous and single command can be dangerous, as China which has become bigger and diverse, cannot be guided in one direction. China already saw the fallout from a single-man dictatorship at the end of Mao’s rule.

Xi’s life-long rule may not be possible as all others retire according to their terms. Conflicts over succession may escalate due to uncertainties over the timing of Xi’s retirement and his successor. Xi has been allowed to make exceptions to solve the accumulated problems from reform processes and new challenges. But his precedent-breaking ways could bring about a greater crisis related to succession.

The power concentration in China may not directly affect the Korea-China relationship. But the impact in the future could fall on Korea in a more systematic and faster manner than in the past. If any developments in the Korea-U.S. relationship undermine Chinese interests while the country battles with America, Beijing’s response may come swifter and harsher than before. Korea may have to pay a dearer price.

That demands Korea to build external strategies more carefully and consistently than before.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.