South Korea saved itself from Indo-Pacific isolation: Victor Cha

Diplomacy

Published: 23 Apr. 2023, 17:59 Updated: 23 Apr. 2023, 18:00

South Korea saved itself from Indo-Pacific isolation: Victor Cha

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), speaks at the JoongAng-CSIS Forum in Seoul in December 2022. [WOO SANG-JO]

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration "saved Korea from self-isolation in the Indo-Pacific" through taking a clearer stance amid the intensifying U.S.-China competition, said former White House official Victor Cha.

"Even though the Korean War is known as the forgotten war, South Korea today demonstrates the victory of the United States and the UN in 1950, as well as the shining example of what the Cold War was fought over," Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told the Korea JoongAng Daily in a recent written interview. "Korea today is a model of what the United States fought for and stood for: economic development, democracy, security, stability and a pillar of the postwar liberal international order."

He added that Korea has until recently been reluctant to join U.S.-led groupings out of fear of alienating China.

Cha said that the Yoon administration's move toward announcing its own Indo-Pacific strategy last December, aligning itself closer to the United States on regional matters, and efforts toward mending diplomatic relations with Japan last month has "opened up opportunities" for South Korea to become a more relevant regional player.

Beijing implemented measures targeting Korean businesses, the country's entertainment industry and tourism against Seoul over its decision with Washington to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) antimissile system to South Korea in 2016 and installation of the battery the following year.

South Koreans constantly worry about another recurrence of retaliatory measures, but Cha said that Seoul does not have to worry too much about another Thaad-type controversy, stressing that the "world has changed" since 2017.

"If China sanctioned Korea in the same way today, the U.S., Europe and other countries would respond to help Korea," he said.

Cha, also a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and Department of Government, previously served as a White House National Security Council (NSC) official in the George W. Bush administration and as a former U.S. negotiator in the now defunct six-party talks for the denuclearization of North Korea.

He was appointed by the Joe Biden administration to serve in an advisory role to the secretary of defense on the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board.

"Korea should make choices between the U.S. and China based on values and not based on self-interest," Cha said. "Making self-interested decisions without values can lead a country in directions it may not want to go."

The following are excerpts from the interview.

Q. The Yoon Suk Yeol government said it will prioritize the U.S. alliance and announced its version of the Indo-Pacific strategy last December. What does such messaging signal to the United States in regard to the evolving alliance?

A. I think the Yoon administration has basically saved Korea from self-isolation in the Indo-Pacific. From [Barack] Obama, through [Donald] Trump and [Joe] Biden, we have seen the growth of democratic coalitions on a range of issues including supply chains, mineral security, FOIP [Free and Open Indo-Pacific] and Quad. Until Yoon, Korea was not participating in any of these, while the U.S., Japan, India, Australia and others were. Korea did not participate because it had prized engagement with North Korea over all else. This then bleeds into China policy to be solicitous of Beijing's help with North Korea, which in turn meant not participating in any groupings that might offend China. In short, it was an appeasement policy to China in order to enable an engagement policy with North Korea that had the effect of isolating Korea among the democracies in Asia.

Yoon has sought to change all of that. Not just in terms of prioritizing the alliance, but also prioritizing repairing relations with Japan. This to me was what was most significant about the force labor compensation agreement. Yoon's solution was not "humiliating," it was demonstrating confidence and leadership. Korea was not going to continue to beg Japan for an apology. It dealt with the compensation with Korean companies and Korean money. If Japan wants to contribute to the fund, that's fine. And if it does not, that's fine too. Because Yoon's real goal is to reconnect Korea to these coalitions, and he knows he cannot do that without Japan. In that regard, the labor agreement opened up opportunities for the Quad, G7, among other things that make Korea stronger vis-à-vis China, North Korea, Russia.

Is Seoul's continued indecisiveness amid the intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition an issue for Washington?

Even with regard to relations with China, the alliance remains strong. This is largely because China has done a lot to shoot itself in the foot with the Thaad (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) sanctions, urea sanctions, among other things. Public opinion in Korea is strongly anti-Chinese. Yes, Korea will sometimes be frustrated about having to choose between its primary security patron and its primary economic patron. But this is the case for all countries and not just Korea in this new era of U.S.-China competition.

Two things are worth noting: first, Korea should make choices between the U.S. and China based on values and not based on self-interest. Making self-interested decisions without values can lead a country in directions it may not want to go. However, if these decisions are guided by values, the state will always know what course it is on and how to make decisions. Second, geography and regime-type matter. South Korea today, or a unified Korea tomorrow, can never change its geography. It will always have the largest country in the world on its border. Moreover, this country is of a different regime type, which is bound to create insecurity spirals. A united Korea-China border is not going to look like the U.S.-Canada border. It will be fortified, reflecting how insecurity spirals naturally arise between two proximate states of different regimes. In such a circumstance, the U.S. alliance will always be strategically valuable to Korea.

What does the Korea-U.S. alliance signify for the United States and why is it still relevant?

The alliance signifies many things for the United States. Even though the Korean War is known as the forgotten war, South Korea today demonstrates the victory of the United States and the UN in 1950, as well as the shining example of what the Cold War was fought over. Korea today is a model of what the United States fought for and stood for: economic development, democracy, security, stability and a pillar of the postwar liberal international order. Koreans may not see themselves this way, but without Korea's success, the Cold War could have turned out very differently in Asia, as well as America's position in Asia.

How has the alliance transformed over the decades?

No alliance of the United States has transformed more in the modern era than that with Korea. Japan was already a great power when the U.S. allied with it. Australia was and is a middle power. The Philippines remains a developing power. Same for Thailand. But Korea went from being one of the poorest countries in the world to an OECD DAC [Development Assistance Committee] country within one generation. And today it has the sixth strongest military in the world and the 10th largest economy. Korea is a major power in the world even though Koreans think of themselves still as a small power.

What are the biggest challenges facing the alliance?

Every alliance has its problems. The existence of these should not discourage folks or raise pessimistic concerns about the alliance's future. Yes, Korea and the U.S. sometimes have fierce trade disputes, but these disputes exist because the two countries have an FTA and vibrant trade.

While the alliance is somewhat politicized in Korea — it is not the case in the U.S. — that is the price to be paid for allying with a vibrant democracy like Korea.

Opcon transition represents a natural evolution of the alliance from a patron-client relationship, as was the case when Syngman Rhee handed over [wartime transfer of operational control] to [U.S. General] Douglas MacArthur to an equal partnership between two independent militaries. Opcon transition will happen over time and not according to any artificial politically-driven timelines.

Koreans are constantly anxious about abandonment by the United States. Should Seoul be worried?

It is my view that the U.S. will never abandon Korea. Japan will always be a U.S. ally. China will always be a competitor of sorts. That makes Korea the crucial piece. If the U.S. loses Korea, it loses Asia. Just as Koreans may still fear U.S. abandonment, some Americans also fear Korean abandonment over a Taiwan contingency. The two allies need to reassure each other.

I know that Koreans are always worried about another Thaad-type controversy with China, but I have to say that 2017 is not 2023. That is, if China sanctioned Korea in the same way today, the U.S., Europe and other countries would respond to help Korea. Moreover, Korea has its own leverage in trade to deal with China. The IRA [Inflation Reduction Act] was disadvantageous to one Korean automaker for a period of maybe 10 to 18 months. Much was made of this in the alliance. But in the long run, the IRA is very beneficial to Korea battery and EV makers and will put them in a stronger position in the U.S. and global market than China.

How does the United States view discussions in Korea about the need for its own nuclear armament? Can Seoul rely on Washington's continued extended deterrence in this region?

The popular polling on Korean views on nuclear weapons is not definitive of policy. First, it's really elite views that matter on national security, not the general public. For example, the polls say over 70 percent of Koreans want nukes, but these same polls say over 65 percent of Koreans are confident in the U.S. security commitment. That does not logically compute. Second, I believe South Korea has no desire to become the second country to leave the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] to become a nuclear weapons state. This would jeopardize everything that Korea has worked so hard to build in terms of its position in the international community.

The most credible sign of U.S. commitment are the ground troops in Korea. This is what Joseph Nye [a professor emeritus at Harvard University] calls the "shared community of fate" between our two countries that ensures the U.S. will always be there if conflict breaks out. Having said this, the U.S. and ROK can still do more to enhance extended deterrence to supplement the traditional security commitment.

What does it mean to upgrade bilateral ties to a "global strategic comprehensive alliance," following the first summit between President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden?

To me, this basically means turning the alliance into an institution that provides only exclusive private goods to one that provides public goods. By private goods, I mean that the alliance largely provided benefits bilaterally to the two members from security to trade issues. But the alliance has grown to encompass U.S. and South Korean cooperation on issues outside of bilateral alliance relations. These include clean and green growth, commanding heights technology protection, resilient supply chains, responsible development assistance, global health, among other things. This means that the U.S. and ROK are working together not just to provide good things to each other, but to provide good things to the world.

What do you envision for the next 70 years of the Korea-U.S. alliance?

The core of the alliance will always be security and trade. The future of the alliance will be in the new frontiers – chips, AI, quantum, outer space, global health. These issues are what make the alliance a global one.

BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]