What the Washington Declaration means
Wi Sung-lac
The author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.
The Washington Declaration between President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden in April has made the U.S. commitment to extended nuclear deterrence more palpable than before. A consultative body was set up to reflect South Korea’s opinion on the use of U.S. strategic assets. The declaration will certainly help strengthen the extended deterrence.
The Washington Declaration was triggered by North Korea threatening the two allies with its nuclear weapons and trying to check U.S. military support for South Korea in times of crisis. As China and Russia sided with North Korea, as expected, the United Nations could not stop Pyongyang from provoking Seoul and Washington. That prompted various demands from South Korea, including its own nuclear armament, redeployment of U.S. tactical weapons, reinforced extended deterrence, and constant deployment of U.S. strategic assets in South Korea. The declaration reflected the Yoon administration’s final choice — a strengthening of the extended deterrence and more frequent deployment of U.S. strategic assets than before.
There are various interpretations of the implications of the Washington Declaration. But first, we must find out what the U.S. really intends to do. Otherwise, we can miss what we must do after the significant declaration.
The U.S is basically reluctant to discuss the operation of its nuclear arsenal with other countries, except for the NATO members with which the U.S. discusses the issue through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). With South Korea, the U.S. has been running the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (Edscg). But after North Korea persistently ratcheted up its nuclear threats and more than 70 percent of South Koreans support the idea of an independent nuclear armament, the U.S. had to find a solution. Washington chose to preempt Seoul from developing its own nuclear weapons after the Yoon administration raised the need to ensure U.S. extended deterrence. The result was the declaration stipulating the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and reaffirming its ally’s allegiance to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
If so, what’s the difference between the NCG and the NPG? Some security experts prefer the NCG to the NPG while others say the two are not a subject for comparison. It seems that the U.S. decided to choose a midpoint between the two — in other words, a joint security body stronger than the Edscg but weaker than the NPG. The NPG — a ministerial-level group — focuses more on “planning,” while the NCG — a deputy ministerial-level group — focuses more on “consultation.” The U.S. appears to have the will to have more talks with the ally over the nuclear operation on a higher level than the Edscg.
The idea may stop short of easing the growing security concerns from South Korea. But what matters is how to maximize the role and function of the NCG. The two allies have so far conducted their joint military drills based on conventional weapons. But now, we must ask ourselves if South Korea is well prepared for a full-fledged consultation with the U.S. over the operation of nuclear weapons. Above all, South Korea should be thoroughly prepared for effective consultations with the U.S. Otherwise, the country will have no other choice but to accept what the U.S. wants each time.
The Washington Declaration also reaffirmed South Korea’s observance of the NPT. That means the Yoon administration gave up the option of independent nuclear armamenta. Despite the massive public support for the country’s own nuclear armament, it cannot be a realistic solution for a country which heavily relies on trade and undergoes an extreme confrontation between the conservatives and the liberals over sensitive issues. Independent nuclear development will most likely deepen South Korea’s isolation from the rest of the world and worsen its internal division, which will endanger the future of the country.
Second, the Yoon administration must convince the people of the obvious problems with developing nuclear weapons on its own, let the public recognize the primacy of ensuring extended deterrence over that, and calm the growing public support for independent nuclear development. I also hope the government makes more effort to persuade the conservatives and the liberals to accept the path it has taken.
Third, as reinforced extended deterrence will likely prompt North Korea to take an even tougher path, the Yoon administration must leave room for diplomacy to deal with it. A jingoistic tit-for-tat approach under such circumstances is not desirable. The government must leave some room for diplomacy with China and Russia so that they can cooperate to achieve a nuclear-free peace on the Korean Peninsula even amid their deepening competition with America.
Such a diplomatic approach will allow the South to take advantage of the situation when the North turns to dialogue. The Washington Declaration certainly enhances the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If we can come up with wise follow-up actions, we can maximize the effect of the declaration. I hope the South Korean government has substantial consultations with its U.S. counterparts on ensuring the extended deterrence, dissuades the public from developing nukes on our own and secures room for diplomacy with North Korea, China and Russia at the same time.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
To write comments, please log in to one of the accounts.
Standards Board Policy (0/250자)