Faceoff bodes ill for both sides

Kim Heung-kyu
The author is the director of the U.S.-China Policy Institute at Ajou University.

In a meeting with Korea’s opposition leader on June 8, Chinese Ambassador to Korea Xing Haiming warned that Korea will regret if it bets on China’s defeat in the hegemony contest with the United States. After the controversial remarks from the Chinese ambassador, Seoul and Beijing exchanged tough tits-for-tats.

It seemed that Korea’s presidential office and Foreign Ministry expected China to resolve the situation by summoning the ambassador home. The government likely wanted to manage the Korea-China relations by defining the incident as Xing’s deviant behavior on his own, rather than a fundamental difference in diplomacy between the two countries. But Beijing not only refused to bring Xing back home, but also ignored Seoul’s intention to manage the worsening bilateral ties.

To speak the conclusion first, Korea must prepare for a long-term — and fundamental — conflict with China. During the period of strategic cooperation between the U.S. and China, Korea’s pro-U.S. policy was not an issue of friction between Seoul and Beijing. But in times of strategic competition between the U.S. and China, Korea’s pro-U.S. policy inevitably incurs the cost of intensifying conflicts with China and Russia. Xing’s provocative remarks cannot be confined to the individual level or represent Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s "wolf warrior diplomacy." Instead, the remarks reflect top Chinese leaders’ policy toward Korea.

Since the launch of the conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration in Korea, China has pursued a policy toward Korea based on careful monitoring and management. But after President Yoon’s remarks suggested a drastic shift to the U.S. in drawing up Korea’s diplomatic and security strategy, Beijing certainly reached the conclusion that the Yoon administration is unfriendly to China. Based on the principle of “a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye,” proclaimed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Korea is veering to “repression and pressure.”

A deepening conflict with Korea is also burdensome for China, as excessive pressure on the neighbor could help strengthen the Korea-Japan-U.S. cooperation. Furthermore, given Korea’s undoubted strength in chip production — a key element in the 4th industrial revolution — China can hardly imagine a full-scale economic clash with Korea. Nonetheless, China seems to have concluded that the Yoon government would never consider China’s core interests — the Taiwan issue, for instance — in Beijing favor, as it believes that Korea has been gladly siding with the China policy of the U.S. and Japan.

Toward Korea, China is expected to take steps similar to the ones it took to block Taiwan. First of all, it will try to besiege Korea militarily. Together with Russia, it will cross the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone (Kadiz) and penetrate into the yet undefined maritime boundaries in the Yellow Sea and the East Sea. Diplomatically, China will reinforce unfriendly measures against Korea. Internationally, it will try to exclude and isolate Korea from the rest of the world by showing an uncooperative attitude toward Korea-led policies. Beijing also will not respond to any request from Seoul to strengthen sanctions against North Korea, while trying to bolster its relations with Pyongyang.

While an all-out economic war with Korea — a chip powerhouse — is not an option for China, it will try to disadvantage Korea economically by using various official and unofficial means. China’s economic policy has already shifted toward decoupling with Korea.

The Yoon administration clearly stands in the position of strengthening the Korea-U.S. alliance, instead of the balanced diplomacy or hedging diplomacy of the Moon Jae-in administration. After discarding the strategic ambiguity the Moon administration used between the U.S. and China, the Yoon administration stresses the strategic clarity of being pro-U.S. largely due to the perception that there is no room to pursue strategic ambiguity any longer during the period of strategic competition between China and the U.S.

As Korea-China relations have been close, conflict and confrontation between the two will cost each other a lot. Under the current circumstances, a gap inevitably exits between the interests and strategic visions of the two countries. Korea and China need wisdom to minimize the cost from the gap, while building up the benefits from future cooperation.

Both sides need strategic flexibility. Rather than expanding conflicts, Korea should refrain from a harsh confrontation and make efforts to stabilize the situation. If a government-to-government contact is difficult, they can have behind-the-scenes talks by taking the opportunity of the Hangzhou Asian Games from Sept. 23 to Oct. 8.

China must decide whether to attend the Korea-China-Japan summit to be held in Korea. It is important for China to understand that Korea’s identity is no longer the one from the hierarchy between the Qing Dynasty and the Joseon Dynasty, but rather an identity based on mutual respect. It is difficult for China to be recognized as a global power when it fails to maintain peace with neighbors and turned to pressure diplomacy. For China, presenting a vision that lays the foundation for economic cooperation with neighboring countries is crucial for regional stability and peace in the future. I hope both Seoul and Beijing demonstrate restraint and wisdom.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands before a summit at a hotel in Bali, Indonesia, Nov. 15, on the sidelines of the Group of 20 Summit in the resort city. [YONAHP]