Don’t bet on wishful thinking
Wi Sung-lac
The author is a former Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.
After North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s unexpected trip to Russia earlier this month, the world is watching to see what steps he and Russian President Vladimir Putin will take after the summit and how China will react. Some bet on a limited impact of the Russia-North Korea cooperation and China’s apparent will to check it. Such an attitude triggers the wishful thinking that South Korea does not have to worry about North Korea getting closer to Russia as Seoul can respond to the alarming development by exploiting China’s reluctance to accept it. How nice would it be if that was true?
North Korea and Russia — both under heavy international sanctions — got closer to each other after the outbreak of the Ukraine war. The two countries think they are the victims of the U.S. hegemony and hostilities toward themselves. While watching the strengthening of the South Korea-U.S. alliance in the Yoon Suk Yeol administration — and the new South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation — Russia and North Korea likely decided to foster their cooperation through the summit in an advanced spaceport in the Russian Far East. Over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, Moscow already took its side. Now that Russia has joined hands with North Korea to confront the U.S.-led security order, it only worsens inter-Korean relations further and lowers the possibility of solving the North Korean nuclear conundrum.
On Russia and North Korea’s part, the summit in Russia was an opportunity to let the rest of the world know about their strategic partnership — and a chance to seek practical interests with reciprocity, as seen in the alleged exchange of Russia’s grains, energy and military technology and North Korea’s conventional weapons. As the trade is mutually beneficial, it will gain momentum.
On South Korea’s part, the Kim-Putin summit has made the South’s cherished strategic partnership with Russia nearly meaningless. Instead, North Korea took the baton from Russia. The South Korea-Russia ties, which already hit rock bottom, are most likely doomed after the Putin-Kim summit.
How will China respond to the Russia-North Korea rapprochement? Certainly, there are differences between China and Russia over the Korean Peninsula issues. But more importantly, the two have been building a strong joint front against their common enemy — the United States. As both China and Russia oppose the South Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance, China would support Russia and North Korea if they form a joint front against the States. So, there is a slim chance of China hurting its relations with Russia by checking Russia’s cooperation with North Korea.
China-Russia relations remain solid even after the Kim-Putin rendezvous in Russia. If South Korea nevertheless dismisses the potential of the Russia-North cooperation and bets on the supposed schisms between Beijing and Moscow, that’s a mistake. Will South Korea’s initiative of strongly responding to the Russia-North engagement by drawing in China really be effective even when Seoul-Beijing ties are at their worst? Such an approach will only provoke Russia and further weaken Seoul’s relations with Moscow. It is more reasonable for South Korea to find countermeasures based on the premise that China and Russia will maintain their solidarity and China and North Korea will reinforce their cooperation down the road.
We must not forget that though the current situation demands policy coordination among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, it inevitably accompanies the opportunity cost — South Korea’s conflict with both Russia and China. That opens an era of our tripartite security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan coinciding with the era of our confrontation against North Korea, China and Russia. The more our relations with China and Russia deteriorate, the more distant our goals of denuclearizing North Korea and achieving peace and unification will be.
The government needs to distinguish what to do right away. Seoul must not worsen its relations with Beijing and Moscow by exchanging diplomatic tit-for-tats. In that case, the room for our diplomatic maneuvering disappears. During the Cold War, Korea stood on the frontline without any diplomatic channels with China and Russia. But at the time, the U.S. and Japan maintained a certain level of diplomatic relations with China and Russia. As a result, South Korea had to pay the heavy price — a lengthened national division, deepening tensions and sharp standoff. We need not return to the past.
Instead, our government must draw up an integrated and well-coordinated strategy to deal with the U.S., China and Russia. Amid the sharp confrontations between Washington and Beijing — and between Washington and Moscow — our diplomatic policy must not be separate. The government must fix our own coordinate in the diplomatic space. Otherwise, the government cannot engage in productive dialogue with China and Russia.
Put simply, the South must devise a best-possible strategy after weighing the movements of Russia and North Korea and the calculations of China. South Korea must pursue broad diplomacy to accomplish the denuclearization, peace and unification in a flexible fashion. That’s the way to go in the new Cold War.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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