Tackling the backlash from three countries

Wie Sung-rak
The author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.

The top news on the diplomatic front this year was the historic summit at Camp David on Aug. 18. Since the meeting between the leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan, diverse consultations have been held on differing levels to prove the smooth sailing of the newfound tripartite security system. Recently, national security advisors of the three countries held a meeting in Seoul. Another summit of the three leaders is also scheduled for next year.

North Korea, China and Russia are responding to the movement sensitively. Given the mounting North Korean nuclear threat and China and Russia’s defiance of the existing order, the security cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan are certainly useful. But South Korea needs cooperation from China and Russia to address its distinct challenge of achieving denuclearization, peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula. That poses another challenge to South Korea: How should it deal with the three countries on the other side?

North Korea had been accelerating the development of nuclear missiles long before the Camp David summit. Recently, the recalcitrant state launched a military reconnaissance satellite and ICBMs and scrapped the Sept. 19 military agreement in Pyongyang five years ago. North Korea took the action in solidarity with Russia. It was Russia that led the movement against the West after Camp David. Russian President Vladimir Putin invited North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to the Vostochny cosmodrome in the Russian Far East in September to hint at its cooperation on space launch vehicle and satellite technology, in clear defiance of UN Security Council resolutions that strictly ban North Korea from launching any type of ballistic missile. Russia also wants an arms trade with North Korea and its workers, which also constitutes a violation of the Security Council resolutions. Kim and Putin’s rendezvous at the Russian space port testifies to their determination to not brush off the trilateral security system, suggesting no limits to their belligerent responses.

China does not react as strongly as Russia. But that doesn’t mean it dismisses the tripartite security cooperation. China believes the United States wants to establish a new security paradigm in Northeast Asia. On China’s part, it would be a serious development if South Korea joins the U.S.-led security paradigm. China would certainly think all its effort to embrace South Korea since the normalization of relations was in vain.

China’s reluctance to immediately join increasingly aggressive Russia stems from their differences in diplomatic styles. While Russia takes a tit-for-tat approach, as seen in its deepening penchant for the combination of diplomatic and military means, China prefers steadily pressuring its counterpart to surrender. China also believes that an instantaneous counteraction could end up pushing South Korea further to the United States.

In other words, China tries to find an effective way to cope with the tripartite security cooperation, starting with putting heavy pressure on South Korea. While criticizing Seoul’s dramatic turn to Washington, Beijing expresses its discontent by refusing to hold a bilateral summit with South Korea on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in San Francisco, or by arbitrarily delaying a South Korea-China-Japan summit to be held in Seoul. China is trying hard not to satisfy South Korea’s needs. In military aspects, China often conducts a joint drill with Russia and infiltrates the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone with Russia without authorization.

North Korea, China and Russia respond to the trilateral security cooperation in their own way. They do not have such solidarity as in the trilateral security system and instead show meaningful differences in their position. That can serve as a centrifugal force in their relationship. But more importantly, their joint response to the U.S.-led security paradigm in Northeast Asia also constitutes their common interest. That serves as a strong centripetal force in their relations. The current Sino-Russia cooperation, at a record high level, proves it.

As the tripartite security cooperation will continue to advance, North Korea, China and Russia will likely show a quid-pro-quo reaction unilaterally or bilaterally, if not trilaterally. In that case, South Korea must bear the biggest burden, because if its relations with North Korea, China and Russia deteriorate, its goal of achieving denuclearization, peace and reunification on the peninsula will be even more distant.

Unfortunately, South Korea does not regard the common interests of North Korea, China or Russia — nor their reactions — as a serious issue. The reluctance appears to stem from South Korea’s tendency to attach more significance to the centrifugal force than to centripetal force.

But the question is whether there will be schisms between China and Russia, which South Korea can take advantage of. Moreover, tightened South Korea-U.S. and South Korea-U.S.-Japan ties amid the tense U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations will not help improve South Korea’s relations with China and Russia. Therefore, it could be better if South Korea deals with its relations with the United States, China and Russia after fixing its own coordinate over the level of its cooperation with the United States — and over the extent of its diplomatic maneuverability for China and Russia — from the start. That approach will increase the likelihood of China and Russia complying with South Korea’s request for dialogue.

The trilateral summit at Camp David was a watershed moment for South Korea’s diplomacy. But it entails opportunity cost. South Korea must skillfully reduce the cost.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.