Russia has crossed the Rubicon on North Korea
Michael Green
The author is CEO of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
When Julius Caesar chose to defy his orders and march on Rome in 49 BCE, he famously told his generals that he had decided to cross the river that he was never allowed to cross with his army — the Rubicon. It meant he was past the point of no return; the consequences be damned.
In three decades of intense diplomacy over North Korea’s nuclear program Russia has been careful not to cross a new metaphorical Rubicon in Northeast Asia. At times Moscow and Beijing have pushed the United States and Korea to make more concessions to the North; have turned a blind eye to North Korean violations of Security Council resolutions; and have been lax in enforcement of sanctions. But neither Moscow nor Beijing ever aided North Korea with arms trade that would directly threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States. For Moscow the consequences geopolitically were too risky while many Russian experts and officials zealously opposed North Korea or any other country joining the elite nuclear weapons club that defined their own status.
This past week we saw that Russia has now crossed that Rubicon. The CSIS Beyond Parallel website used commercial satellite imagery in a report on December 8 to demonstrate that North Korean continues shipping arms to Russia from Najin Port even after warnings by the White House. Korea’s National Intelligence Service has confirmed that Russia assisted Pyongyang with its most recent satellite launch and probably received over 1000 artillery shells in return. Moscow is clearly desperate for weapons to sustain its flagging combat capabilities against Ukraine’s military and to terrorize innocent Ukrainain civilians, but this development is also further evidence of Vladmir Putin’s belief that the world is in a bipolar clash of political systems like the Cold War. Meanwhile Pyongyang could not be happier with this return to a Cold War approach by Moscow. And the rest of us face a more dangerous North Korea as a result.
What can Seoul and Washington do?
One option that will not work would be to appease Moscow to gain greater cooperation on North Korea. Putin’s goal is to win in Ukraine, divide U.S. alliances — and only as a much lower priority — to contain the North Korean nuclear threat. In fact, he has incentive to heighten the North Korean threat to pull U.S. satellite and other strategic capabilities away from Europe and Ukraine. If Seoul tried to entice Moscow to end support of Pyongyang, Putin would only see weakness and opportunity. He would trumpet the defection of a key U.S. ally from the coalition on Ukraine but would do little to end arms trade with North Korea since that remains a far higher priority than good relations with Seoul in terms of the fight in Ukraine and the struggle against America. I dismiss this only for academic purposes, since I see no sign that the Yoon administration will go down this self-defeating path. Nor is this to say that Seoul should abandon diplomatic outreach to Moscow on the North Korea nuclear issue, since many in the Russian government would still be wary of the North’s nuclear ambitions. But there is no card Seoul can play to make cooperation on North Korea more attractive to Moscow.
Then there are the sticks. Korea’s stand with the democracies on Ukraine matters. It is not the cause of Moscow’s arms trade with Pyongyang — the reasons for that can be found in the mud and blood of Russia’s quagmire in Ukraine. But Korean neither will support for Ukraine push Russia to be more cooperative on the Korean peninsula in itself. Still, the unity of the democracies is an invaluable deterrent against the next authoritarian use of force, whether that relates to Beijing’s ambitions on Taiwan or North Korean provocations. The solidarity of U.S. allies and partners on Ukraine has demonstrated that attacks on a democracy will result in devastating economic sanctions and geopolitical isolation. True, the so-called “Global South” is less convinced, but when one adds up the economic, technological, and diplomatic weight of the most advanced industrial economies in the world, it becomes clear how steep the price of aggression can be … as Moscow helped demonstrate.
The question is whether Moscow’s violation of UNSC sanctions merits specific additional consequences. I would argue that it does. These consequences should include at a minimum joint condemnation by all U.S. allies and additional punitive economic sanctions against Moscow for blatantly violating UNSC sanctions. This cannot be pursued through the Security Council, given Russia’s veto, but the legal basis for sanctions is still clear.
Consideration should also be given to maritime interdiction of the vessels carrying these weapons pursuant to UNSC resolutions and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States, UK, Australia, and others have committed to working with Korea to enforce UN Sanctions against North Korea and the Russian arms trade clearly falls within that mandate. The interdictions would be operationally and geopolitically risky since Moscow’s response could be belligerent. In terms of deterrence, however, the Russian escalation cannot go unanswered. For now, the trade appears to be artillery rounds and conventional weapons from North Korea in exchange for technical assistance with rocket launches from Russia. But Moscow may also be helping North Korea with its SLBM program and could slide towards assisting Pyongyang not just with launch technology but also re-entry vehicles necessary for nuclear weapons. Where does Moscow draw that line? We do not know any more, which is all the more reason to demonstrate before the decision that there will be significant consequences for violating UNSC sanctions and threatening American, Korean and Japanese security.
And then there is China, which will be watching closely the U.S. and allied response to Russia-DPRK defense trade with an eye to the implications for Beijing’s own support of Moscow and increasingly unhelpful stance towards North Korea.
Moscow may have crossed the Rubicon. But deterrence can still work.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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