[Column] The ball is in Japan’s court

Park Young-june

The author is a professor of international politics at Korea National Defense University.

One of the most important diplomatic assets for Korea’s security policy is the Korea-U.S. alliance. But for the decades-long alliance to function smoothly, it should be supported by the U.S.-Japan alliance. What connects the two alliances like an adhesive is Korea-Japan relations.

Such crucial bilateral relations were frozen over the past after the Korean Supreme Court’s ruling in October 2018 in favor of direct compensation by Japanese companies for the surviving victims of forced labor during World War II. The Japanese government responded immediately. It criticized Korea for being “a country that does not abide by international laws,” referring to the 1965 Korea-Japan Basic Treaty which “effectively ended any possible wartime claims from Korea” in return for $300 million in grants and $200 million in loans to help develop the struggling Korean economy at the time.

After the top court’s ruling five years ago, the liberal Moon Jae-in administration sat on its hands, citing the need to uphold the principle of separation of powers. The administration even threatened to terminate the General Status of Military Information Agreement (Gsomia) with Japan after Tokyo enforced an export ban on strategic materials needed to produce semiconductors in Korea.

The rapid deterioration of bilateral relations weakened Korea’s diplomatic leverage on the global stage and damaged its participation in international security networks. In the meantime, Japan heartily joined the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with Australia and India to reinforce its role overseas and augment its diplomatic stature around the globe. In contrast, the Moon administration chose to downscale Korea’s regular military drills with the U.S. forces and continued to isolate itself from U.S-driven international security networks by adhering to its novel strategic ambiguity.

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration’ bold plan to resolve the wartime forced labor issue reflects the urgency to find a breakthrough in the diplomatic deadlock. The solution was designed to compensate surviving victims through a Korea-led fund — contributed to by Korean companies, who benefited from the Japanese grants and loans, and possibly by some Japanese companies involved in the wartime forced labor — to help normalize security and diplomacy of the country.

The international security order is changing much faster than in 2018 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The heightened military tension over the Taiwan Strait amid the heated U.S.-China contest over global hegemony will certainly have direct impact on the security situation in the Korean Peninsula. After South Korea and the U.S. have resumed their annual military exercises in a full-fledged way, North Korea continues its signature missile provocations as if to prove its nervousness.

If the Yoon administration avoids finding a realistic solution to compensate the surviving victims and just leave the battered bilateral relations unattended, that constitutes a brazen dereliction of duty. The government reached the decision to take responsibility for the victims and their families as the state and play its due role. The move will also help strengthen our security environment by putting bilateral relations back on track.

In 1965, President Park Chung Hee took the bold step of normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan in the face of massive opposition to the idea in Korea. In 1998, President Kim Dae-jung effectively persuaded Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to sign the Kim-Obuchi joint declaration, which included sincere regrets over Japan’s colonial rule, to pave the way for a better future even while confronting the past. President Yoon’s solution to the conundrum can represent a succession of Kim Dae-jung’s policy with Japan in diplomatic terms.

Regrettably, some progressive civic groups and surviving victims refuse to accept the government-proposed solution to help them. Related government ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, must do their best to convince them of the inevitability of the solution and persuade them to accept it.

It is also regrettable that Tokyo has not announced to take a step corresponding to Seoul’s proposal. I hope Japan takes a reciprocal action after Yoon made a very difficult decision to improve Korea-Japan relations.

I hope Japan makes it clear that Tokyo will consistently inherit the 1993 Kono Statement expressing regret over wartime sexual slavery for the imperial Japanese Army and the 1995 Murayama Statement expressing repentance over Japan’s colonial rule.

Japan must ensure Japanese companies’ voluntary participation in the Korea-led fund. A reciprocal action by Tokyo will serve as a stepping stone to strengthen mutual cooperation for the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. The ball is in Japan’s court.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.