Can North Korea launch a nuclear strike?

Park Won-gon
The author is a professor of North Korea studies at Ewha Womans University.

On April 2, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un claimed that the country succeeded in “nuclear weaponization of all types of missiles,” including hypersonic “Hwasong-16 Type-B missiles.” With the developments, North Korea now can fire solid fuel-based short, intermediate and long range missiles tipped with maneuvering warheads, he said.

If proven true, his claim signifies the North’s formidable nuclear attack capability — evading South Korea-U.S. interceptor missiles and conducting a surprise attack at any time. Kim’s remarks came after his definition last year of inter-Korean relations as “being between two hostile states.” On February 8 — the North’s Military Foundation Day — Kim made it official. “Our national goal is to conquer and control the whole South Korean territory,” he underscored.

Kim moved on to check the North’s invasion scenario after South Korea and the United States started their annual Freedom Shield joint drills last month. Despite Pyongyang’s apparent reluctance to reveal its operation plan in detail, the recent developments in the North, including a spate of missile provocations, clearly suggest the future direction of its war against the South.

The aggression will be triggered by a military clash around the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. If the South responds to the North’s provocation, Pyongyang will most likely fire its long-range artillery or multiple rocket launchers deployed along the western front at Seoul and Gyeonggi, followed by a massive penetration by ground troops led by tanks and armored vehicles — and possibly accompanied by the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons so as to take control in the initial stages of the war.

The United States is required to send large-scale reinforcements in times of crisis on the Korean Peninsula, according to the allies’ joint wartime operation plan (Oplan). Given the North’s primary fear about the reinforcements, it will do whatever it can to block them. That’s why North Korea has been bent on developing intermediate-range missiles that can strike as far as Guam, a major air base for U.S. strategic assets in the Pacific, and the rear bases of the United Nation’s Command in Japan.

Kim recently took steps precisely based on that scenario. Following his “field guidance” on March 6 for a military operation training base on the western front, which is commissioned to launch attacks on the NLL, he visited an artillery unit the next day, observed a tank unit exercise on March 13, and five days later, closely monitored a shelling drill of super-large multiple rocket launchers allegedly capable of firing tactical nukes. Kim then went to see the engine test of a new hypersonic missile on March 19 and watched the test launch on April 2 of a hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile that can strike Japan and Guam.

The saber-rattling from Kim makes us wonder if North Korea can invade South Korea. Did Kim really make a decision to start another Korean War, as some doves in the U.S. suggested? Could the North really launch a nuclear attack against the South, as Kim and his sister repeatedly warned?

Of course, North Korea can start a nuclear war. But when you take a deeper look at the possibility, a preemptive strike could be just a pipe dream. To launch a first strike, you must have a second strike capability. Otherwise, you will be destroyed if the enemy launches a counterattack with even more nukes. Waging a nuclear war against a country like the United States without possessing “assured retaliation capability” is a suicidal act. North Korea cannot afford nuclear capabilities on par with Uncle Sam given his absolute supremacy in deterrence, defense against a first strike, and retaliation after the first attack.

Despite the North’s launch of a military reconnaissance satellite last November, its spying capabilities cannot match that of the United States, which can detect any signs of preparation for a preemptive strike in advance through multi-layered surveillance equipment. If the signs are clear, Washington can launch a precision strike at the very source of the provocation. Even if the United States fails to destroy the missiles, it still can intercept them through the missile defense system built in Alaska and the mainland. Even if the defense system fails again, the United States still can devastate the North with high-yield strategic weapons such as submarine-launched Trident II D5 missiles to carry out massive punishment and retaliation.

Nevertheless, North Korea persistently sends the message that it can start a war and that it will use both conventional and nuclear weapons in the initial stages of a war in the peninsula.

Some security experts claim that North Korea can achieve its political and military goals by launching a low-yield nuclear attack on South Korea first and then threaten to conduct a strategic strike on the continental U.S. For instance, the North can maximize fear by first firing low-yield nukes at small cities or rural areas of the South in the early stage of the war — and if America prepares a nuclear counterattack, North Korea can threaten to fire its ICBMs like the Hwasong-15, 17 and 18 at Washington so as to deter nuclear retaliation from the U.S. Under this scenario, North Korea can seek a victory even without engaging in a full-scale nuclear war.

However, can the North really reap what it wants? First of all, the allies’ multi-layered missile defense system is not so easy to penetrate. Even if North Korea manages to evade the tight system, it must ready itself for an all-out war, because its first strike will inevitably incur massive casualties in mostly densely-populated South Korea.

The South does not have nuclear weapons, but it can destroy the North Korean leadership by using sophisticated missiles capable of carrying out precision strikes — including Hyunmoo-5 intermediate-range missiles tipped with nine-ton warheads — and F-35 stealth fighters that can destroy targets without being detected. If the North uses nuclear weapons, the United States will unfurl the nuclear umbrella. It will have to launch an even stronger counterattack against the North to deter it from launching a second strike on its mainland. A full-scale demonstration of the allied power will certainly result in the demise of the Kim Jong-un regime. If Kim is not insane, he cannot start a war, as he will lose everything he has now.

Even if North Korea threatens to mix conventional and nuclear weapons, the two allies can surely deter a war if they have the will and ability to respond with overwhelming military power. The key lies in sending the message that any kind of nuclear attack will be met with massive retaliation leading to the end of the regime in Pyongyang, as stipulated in the Korea-U.S. summit in Washington last April, the 54th and 55th Security Consultative Meetings in 2022 and 2023 and the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

If the U.S. declares “No First Use” unless the North uses nuclear weapons, it could be effective in preventing the spread of war. However, we must take a prudent approach to the argument for the redeployment of U.S. tactical weapons in the South. It can send North Korea the wrong signal that the Unites States will respond to the North’s low-yield nukes only proportionately or in a limited way.

Kim Jong-un may want to conquer South Korea. But it means an end to the seven-decade-long Kim dynasty. As the Korea-U.S. Oplan goes into effect only when North Korea launches a preemptive strike, improving his people’s lives will help Kim extend the dynasty, not obsessively raising the level of its nuclear capabilities. It will be even better for the North Korean leader to massively mobilize military troops to revive the economy to promote welfare of his own people.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.