Addressing the woes from Japan’s bet on the U.S.

Chung Jae-hong

The author is an international, diplomatic and security news editor of the JoongAng Ilbo.

In the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Japan-Philippine summits in Washington last week, U.S. President Joe Biden defined Japan as “a global partner” in defending international order and entrusted Japan with the mission of checking China. Biden stressed that the two countries will act together on the world stage to uphold and bolster a free and open international order based on the rule of law.

U.S. President Joe Biden, right, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida hold a joint press conference at the White House after their summit on April 10. [KIM HYOUNG-GU]

In a joint statement after their summit at the White House, President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida affirmed the U.S.-Japan alliance as “the cornerstone of peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.” Biden reiterated the unwavering commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Mutual Security Treaty. The alliance based on the United States’ unilateral defense of Japan has evolved into a reciprocal relationship jointly engaging in the peace and security of East Asia and, more broadly, the Indo-Pacific.

The two countries’ military alliance is also expanding to multilateral security consultative bodies. The joint statement mandates the United States, Japan and Australia seek cooperation in building a joint missile defense network and start a regular military exercise from 2025. Biden made it official: Japan will participate in the Pillar Two of the Aukus — a security consultative body among the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia — to jointly advance their military capabilities on eight cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyber security, undersea technology and hypersonic missiles. The U.S. National Security Council announced that it is considering adding Korea, Canada and New Zealand to Pillar Two of the Aukus.

With the developments, Japan can play a bigger role in the new U.S.-led global security system by joining mini-lateral cooperative entities. That means a significant change in the security structure of East Asia from the U.S.-led separate alliances with Korea, Japan and the Philippines to several mini-lateral alliances primarily based on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In a speech to a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress last week, the Japanese prime minister said, “We first became a regional partner of the United States, and now we have become your global partner. Never has our relationship been so close, our vision and approach so united.” U.S. senators and House representatives gave a standing ovation to Kishida’s speech designed to relive Uncle Sam of his growing burden from his role as a “world policeman.”

Japan’s elevated global status owes much to the same U.S.-Japan interests. Since its failures in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Wall Street-triggered global financial crisis in 2008, the United States has used the strategy of transferring more of its international roles — and costs — to its allies to keep China’s fast rise in check. Just think of the Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia policy, the joint statement of Korea, the United States and Japan at Camp David last August, and the global partnership declaration between the United States and Japan last week.

Japan, too, needs to check China, its archrival in East Asia. Tokyo must deal with China together with its ally, as it can’t do the job alone. The United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at encircling China was initially proposed by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. With that strategy, Japan can lessen the burden on the United States, elevate its international stature and gain economic benefits.

The problem is Korea. Heavyweights in U.S. political circles increasingly demand Korea take a bigger responsibility on the global stage to fit its economic power today. To tackle the deepening nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, the United States’ extended deterrence and U.S. forces in South Korea are the key to ensuring the South’s security. But South Korea can hardly keep China in check the same way Japan does together with America, due to its heavy economic reliance on China.

If Seoul simply ignores — or deviates from — Washington’s strategy to check China based on the U.S.-Japan alliance, it will be a critical mistake. Korea must draw up its diplomatic strategy focused on the Korea-U.S. alliance to ensure its survival. To do that, Seoul needs to improve relations with Tokyo. To the United States, Japan is an ally more important than Korea. During the past Moon Jae-in administration, Korea’s relations with the United States deteriorated after the country’s relations with Japan worsened. Our government must set a comprehensive, farsighted diplomatic strategy of participating in the U.S. strategy to deal with China while deliberately managing the Korea-U.S.-Japan relations and its relations with China and Russia.