Watch the volatility — not fall — of the regime
Published: 09 Oct. 2024, 20:24
Kim Byung-yeon
The author is a chair professor of economics at Seoul National University.
The collapse of the Soviet empire hit Soviet scholars like an unforeseen earthquake. Most experts as well as the empire’s closest U.S. watchdog, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), failed to see it coming. Most of them overestimated the strength of the Soviet economy, thinking it would somehow trudge into the 21st century. Their misjudgment came under severe scorn. The U.S. Senate even motioned a bill to abolish the CIA and place it under the Secretary of State. Some researchers on the Soviet Union lost their jobs.
A nation’s collapse is hard to predict. A regime loses ground from the implosion of accumulated structural decays accelerated by sudden externalities. The economy posed as the flash point of Soviet downfall. People had to queue for hours everyday for foodstuff and other necessities at state-administered shops whose shelves were mostly empty. They trusted the black market or direct trade with farmers more even if they had to pay more. Impotent leadership and policy failures worsened matters.
Perestroika reforms of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev loosened surveillance and control over society, enabling more freedom of expression and strikes to demand higher wages.
The sudden easing in central planning without a functional market to replace it worsened fiscal conditions and stoked inflation. The feeble regime easily gave in upon external shocks — the failure of the Afghanistan invasion and independence movements of Eastern European republics. A coup attempt in August 1991 by Soviet hardliners to oust progressive Gorbachev delivered the final blow. But Soviets already had long deserted the ancient regime. When Boris Yeltsin, the newly elected president, stood on the side of the civilian democratic movement, the regime finally came down and pulled down the communist flag.
The Soviet case implies the sustainability of a regime relying on the will of its people. The North Korean regime cannot last under the current structure. The majority of North Koreans who had a taste of the free market through the black market prefer capitalism that respects individual freedom and trade over state control. North Korea inevitably would have to choose the models of other socialist states — converting to capitalism after collapses like the Soviet Union and East European countries or peacefully and incrementally incorporating a hybrid system through opening up and undergoing reforms like China and Vietnam. Given the rigidity of its power structure, Pyongyang will likely go down the path of the former Soviet bloc. But there is still the chance of Kim Jong-un or his successor choosing the Chinese and Vietnamese model upon market demand.
How strong is North Korea compared to the later Soviet Union? In terms of the economy, North Korea is much weaker than the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. The majority of North Koreans feel that their life is threatened from deficiencies. Because most are engaged in private business activities, they already prefer capitalism. Kim and Gorbachev are on par in state mismanagement. Kim’s idea of resurrecting a state-controlled economy has worsened economic stability and aggravated the ongoing crisis. The policy of bumping up wages multiple times and his plan of creating light-industry factories in 20 provincial locations every year over a decade are some disastrous examples.
The fundamental weakness to the country’s internal strength is Kim’s obsession with nuclear weapons. Prioritizing the nuclear program over the economy might have helped sustain the regime at first. But with the economy degenerating into a basket case and the regime allegedly possessing more than 50 nuclear weapons, it would be wiser for Kim to put more resources into building the economy rather than nuclear weapons.
Yet Kim remains hungry for nuclear development and uninterested in the economy. He appears to be sinking deeper into the trap of “path dependence” for two reasons. First, he thinks he may lose leverage over the United States and South Korea if he eases up on the nuclear program and therefore miss a bonanza of drawing returns from negotiating nuclear disarmament or freeze. He also seems to misconstrue that his grip on power can weaken if he ditches the “Mr. Nuclear” moniker. Faced with a dilemma, Kim chooses to stick to his old path and pursue nuclear advancement while reinforcing his reign of terror to silence internal complaints. He also oppresses market activities until residents give up longing for capitalism. But the outcome is the opposite, as the disgruntlement of residents and bureaucrats only grows while confidence in the regime quickly sinks.
The geopolitical climate has been favorable to the North Korean regime. China and Russia won’t let North Korea crumble as the North serves as leverage against the United States. Unlike the late Soviet days, there are no strong forces who can challenge Kim. Pyongyang boasts the most powerful watch system among dictatorships. But what helped sustain the regime can suddenly work against it depending on the change of geopolitical winds around the Korean Peninsula and the movements of North Korean elites.
Only God will know the fate of a regime. It cannot be planned or predetermined by humans. We must not be swayed by the theories that North Korea will never collapse or is near collapse. The right word should be volatility and not collapse. We must be ready for volatility in the regime, which may escalate over the next few years. The fate of the Korean Peninsula will depend on our readiness.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
To write comments, please log in to one of the accounts.
Standards Board Policy (0/250자)