Minilateralism is the way to go for South Korea

Ramon Pacheco Pardo

The author is a professor of international relations at King’s College London and KF-VUB Korea Chair at Brussels School of Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

Last week’s trilateral summit between South Korea, the United States and Japan confirmed a development that has transformed global politics in recent years: minilateralism has replaced multilateralism as the main driver of cooperation among countries.

This has important implications for South Korea. Along with Australia, Canada, the European Union or Japan, Seoul has long supported multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization as the main forum to foster international cooperation and reduce inter-state tensions. However, Sino-American competition has put an end to the golden era of multilateralism that followed the Cold War. Even the Group of 20, an exclusive institution yet originally meant to support multilateral governance, has become paralyzed due to tensions between China and the United States as well as, more recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In this context, South Korea should focus on strengthening its minilateral network. This does not mean abandoning multilateralism, but it does mean prioritizing the type of institutions that today will be most helpful for Seoul to achieve its foreign policy and security goals.

To its credit, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration seems to understand the new reality of global politics. South Korea-United States-Japan trilateralism is the most noteworthy case and should become a cornerstone of Seoul’s deterrence strategy vis-à-vis North Korea and China. President-level summits, working-level meetings, joint exercises or information and intelligence sharing are among the many concrete steps that the three partners are taking — helping South Korea to boost its own security.

But this is not the only security minilateral that Seoul is focusing on. NATO-AP4 ties, involving South Korea, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, have made the headlines when Yoon attended the organization’s last two summits in Madrid, Spain, and Vilnius, Lithuania. More quietly, the four countries are holding regular working-level meetings together in Brussels and also with other NATO members to cement their ties. This helps boost South Korea’s security on issues ranging from cyber to non-proliferation.

In the area of trade and economics, South Korean leaders have long understood that minilateralism is the name of the game. Seoul joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement and its announced application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership are some examples. Interestingly, these initiatives either include or could potentially include China. This shows that what may work in the area of security — in other words, the United States in and China out — may not necessarily work for Seoul’s economic strategy.

Even in economics, the Yoon government seems to be pursuing a strategy that excludes China in certain areas. Technology and supply chains are the most straightforward cases. Seoul-Washington-Tokyo trilateralism, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, the Minerals Security Partnership or the Chip 4 Alliance all put strong emphasis on Washington working with its partners to maintain a technological edge over China. The focus is on excluding Beijing from the supply chain of cutting-edge technologies, whether semiconductors or AI.

Most notably, Seoul seems to have de facto become a member of an informal Group of 7 Plus network involving the G7 members, the EU, plus Australia and India. With the G7 itself having become obsolete, given its strong transatlantic leanings, we can expect the G7 Plus to increasingly focus on cementing geopolitical and geoeconomic cooperation among its members.

Some may fret that Seoul’s focus on minilateralism implies making a “choice” between the United States and China. But this choice is inescapable in a growing number of areas as long as multilateralism continues to be paralyzed. Certainly, Seoul should not stop cooperating with Beijing. And minilateralism involving the United States runs the risk of collapsing if Donald Trump or a Trump-like president replaces Joe Biden.

Yet, Seoul risks isolation if it excludes itself from minilateral groups in the hope that multilateralism will come back or that Sino-American rapprochement will allow South Korean policymakers to avoid making a choice. Plus, U.S. partners involved in minilateral networks see them as a way of ensuring that Washington remains engaged no matter who lives in the White House.

South Korea needs to focus on strengthening minilateralism, particularly when it comes to institutions with concrete, meaningful deliverables to which South Korea can contribute its resources while also benefiting from them.