Preventing a U.S.-North deal next time

Park Tae-gyun
The author is a professor of Korean studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University.

On January 14 — just a day before the Iowa Republican caucus — former U.S. President Donald Trump attributed his “successful resolution” of the North Korean nuclear issue during his first term to his friendly relations with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. In a rally on the eve of the first vote of the Republicans in the leadoff state, Trump on his campaign for a second term said, “Kim Jong-un [is] very smart, very tough, but he liked me and I got along really well with him and we were safe.”

Earlier, Trump stressed that if he had won the 2020 presidential election, he would have dissuaded North Korea from attempting to wage a nuclear war through a successful negotiation with Kim. In his book “Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict,” Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development in the Trump administration, faithfully shared his boss’ position by underscoring the inevitability of negotiations with North Korea.

Considering Trump’s towering performance in the nomination race so far, he will most likely reenter the White House. Despite his judicial risks, Trump is leading the pack with overwhelming margins in the early stage of the nomination contest. In a number of polls, Trump also shows higher approval ratings than current President Joe Biden in all of the seven swing states of North Carolina, Georgia, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Nevada and Arizona.

One may now wonder if a former U.S. president can run for reelection after losing the previous election. But no Article in the U.S. Constitution bans it. Grover Cleveland was sworn in as the 22nd President in 1885 and lost the following election, yet served as the 24th president from 1893 to 1897.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump, right, poses with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for a photo during their Singapore summit in July 2018. [AFP/YONHAP]

The high possibility of the former president’s reelection compels us to look back on what he did during the first term. The Trump administration’s policy quite resembled the Nixon administration’s in the early 1970s. Both Trump and Richard Nixon took office during tough times for the U.S. economy. While Nixon wrestled with the ramifications of the Vietnam War, Trump struggled with the repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic. The two leaders from the Republican Party assumed their presidencies amid harsh fiscal conditions.

To find a breakthrough in the fiscal trouble, Nixon chose a policy of détente with the Eastern Bloc. He sought to ameliorate the mounting fiscal burden by easing tensions around the world, including a clandestine scheme to withdraw or reduce U.S. forces overseas. Nixon put the plan into action, as seen in the pullouts of U.S. forces from Vietnam and Thailand and his downsizing of the troops stationed in South Korea and the Philippines. Nixon met with Chairman Mao and agreed with the Soviet Union on nuclear reduction, not to mention abandoning America’s value-based diplomacy to help restore fiscal health and revitalize the economy.

During the time, inter-Korean dialogue kicked off. In 1972, South Korea announced the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué aimed at improving inter-Korean relations and made the June 23 Declaration the following year endorsing a joint United Nations membership and opening South Korea to Communist states. South Korea even proposed a mutual non-aggression treaty to North Korea in 1974. Such proposals were in sync with Dr. Kissinger’s proposal of a cross-recognition of the two Koreas with the United States and Japan on one side and by China and Russia on the other. If not for the Watergate scandal, U.S. ground forces might have completely withdrawn by 1975.

During his first term, Trump demanded that all countries pay their fair share of defense costs. He even pressured not only South Korea, but also Japan and NATO — the United States’ most pivotal allies — to pay more in order for America to protect them, pointing to the 2 percent share specified in the agreement with other members of the NATO. Trump even hinted at the possibility of the U.S. seceding from NATO and ordered his country to leave Unesco and the Paris Climate Agreement, citing the former’s stance against Israel and the latter’s incompatibility with U.S. energy policy.

Trump could be the most “candid” president in the history of America. He straightforwardly explained — and executed — the Republican Party’s isolationist policy without any diplomatic rhetoric.

Nixon, by contrast, could be the type who stabs an ally in the back. He promised that the United States would consult with Korea over the withdrawal or reduction of its forces if the South were to send its troops to Vietnam. But he didn’t keep the promise and abruptly withdrew the 7th Division from South Korea in 1971. Nixon also attempted to change the chief representative of the Military Armistice Commission of the United Nations Command (UNC) from an American general to a Korean general the same year and considered returning the wartime operational control (Opcon) to the South Korean military.

If Trump is re-elected president, he will pressure South Korea more bluntly than before, demanding more cost-bearing for the USFK. At the same time, the egomaniac will push for renegotiation with Kim Jong-un. When inter-Korean relations are good, South Korea can participate in the U.S.-led negotiation with North Korea. Otherwise, the South will likely be excluded from U.S.-North talks.
The novel exchange of “love letters” between Trump and Kim Jong-un before and after their 2019 Hanoi meeting strongly suggests such a possibility. In a letter to Trump on Sept. 21, 2018, Kim wrote, “I want to discuss the denuclearization issue directly with Your Excellency from now without South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s participation.” Kim added, “We don’t need President Moon’s excessive interest in our own problems.”

Their special bromance was resilient. After the failed summit in Hanoi, Kim sent a letter to Trump once again to clearly explain the conditions for the resumption of their rendezvous. On Aug. 5, 2019, Kim wrote, “Please call me again when the U.S. forces finish their military game and war exercises with the South’s military. We will discuss the time and place for working-level talks after the drills.”

If Trump Administration 2.0 is launched, we will likely see a repeat of the lead-up to the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea. Under tense inter-Korean ties over Seoul’s botched sending of a mourning delegation to Pyongyang after Kim Il Sung’s death in July of that year, the United States directly contacted the North to reach a deal to build two light-water reactors in North Korea in exchange for freezing its operation and construction of nuclear reactors suspected of being part of a covert nuclear weapons program. Seoul was methodically alienated from the deal and yet had to bear the biggest cost, among stakeholders, for the reactors. South Korea suffered the same isolation in 1968 when it was forced to simply watch U.S.-North contacts at Panmunjom after North Korean commandos’ failed attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee.

Recent remarks from Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong have sounded more alarms than before. On many occasions since December 2023, Kim Jong-un has defined “the puppet regime in South Korea” as “the most harmful country and a permanent archenemy of North Korea.” In a case of emergency, North Korea will occupy South Korea, he proclaimed.

Kim Jong-un’s current rhetoric is tougher than ever. Since the signing of the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement, North Korea has never abandoned the grandiose goal of unification, no matter what conflict it faces. The state opposed the June 23 Declaration due to its opposition to the two-Korea status quo. Even after the nations’ simultaneous entry to the UN, North Korea did not scrap its goal of unification.

Kim Yo-jong, the North Korean leader’s younger sister, went a step further in a Jan. 2 New Year’s message to President Yoon Suk Yeol. “We suffered big losses as we wasted much time bolstering our war capabilities even without doing what should due to [former President] Moon Jae-in’s bogus peace initiatives,” Kim said. Her comment reflects the North’ intention not to negotiate with South Korea.

Given the high possibility of Trump’s reelection, our government must prepare for the worst case. Even if Biden succeeds in extending his term, nothing will change, as the peninsula issues are on the back burner due to the wars in Ukraine and Israel. Would Uncle Sam really endorse his ally’s retaliation against the North if it abandons the principle of unification and launches a military provocation against the South?

Considering Trump’s eccentric character and Kim’s aberrant rhetoric, we may see a repeat of the developments in 1968 and 1994. If Trump is reelected, Pyongyang will most likely return to improving its relations with Washington while further isolating Seoul. To proactively deal with such a dangerous turn of events, South Korea must contact the North, and the sooner the better — not because of its fear of Pyongyang, but because of the need to avoid the worst-possible scenario. Seoul must also restore relations with Beijing to further deter North Korea from taking a perilous path.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.